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Jan., 1952
RELIEF UPON DEFAULT UNDER A CONTRACT
FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF LAND
BY ELLIS J. SOBOL*
This article has as its object a determination of the status of
Colorado law in regard to contracts for the purchase and sale of
real estate.
The law of property is peculiar in that upon the execution of
a contract for the purchase and sale of land the vendee acquires
an equitable interest in the land; in some jurisdictions it is neces-
sary that the vendee enter upon the land pursuant to the contract
in order to acquire his equitable interest.1 The vendee gets such
an interest in spite of clauses in the contract saying that he is to
acquire no interest whatsoever in the land until all of the payments
making up the full purchase price have been paid. Specifically,
the question to be examined is: what facts must exist before the
court will treat the relationship of the parties as that of mortgagor
and mortgagee and declare that the interest of the vendee in the
land upon his breach cannot be forfeited except by a foreclosure
and sale; or failing that, when will equity step in and aid the ven-
dee by giving him a chance to redeem by making payment within
a specified time? 2 It has been stated by the Colorado court, as
well as by courts of other jurisdictions, that it is of importance
in the court's determination-in cases where there is a breach by
the vendee and an attempt by the vendor to enforce a forfeiture-
whether the contract contains clauses making time of the essence
and providing for a forfeiture of all improvements and payments
made by the vendee upon his failure to meet any payment on time
and notice by the vendor declaring a forfeiture. 3 The inequity in
the enforcement of such provisions is at once apparent. The less
the importance of the breach by the vendee, the greater the amount
forfeited to the vendor as penalty or liquidated damages ;4 besides,
if the relationship of the parties is like that of mortgagor and
mortgagee, a time-of-essence clause should have no more effect than
a similar clause in a mortgage.5 It is thought by the writer that
time-of-essence and forfeiture clauses are not really of great im-
portance in Colorado, but rather, that the cases must be distin-
guished on other facts; that of prime importance are: the amount
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
deFuniak, HAND3OOK OF MODERN EQUITY, pp. 242, 243 (1st Edition, 1950).
2
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY, pp. 429, 430 (1930).
3American Mortgage Co. v. Logan, 90 Colo. 157, 7 P. 2d 953 (1932). 3 WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS, § 791 (Revised Edition, 1936). CORBIN, The Right of a Default-
ing Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1030.
POMIEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1408 (4th ed., 1918).
4 CORBIN, Op. Cit., pp. 1014 & 1029.
WILLISTON, Op. cit., § 791.
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of the purchase price paid in relation to the total purchase price,
the time in default, whether after default the vendee is ready and
willing to tender payment, and whether the vendee is in possession.
CONTRACT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE SIMILAR TO MORTGAGE
The early Colorado cases are not of much help because counsel
for the vendor had not yet made use of an action for possession
and forfeiture. But it is at once clear that the court recognized
that such transactions are similar to a mortgage and that the
primary object of the parties is to secure to the vendor the pay-
ment of the full purchase price. In Todd v. Simonton 6 the defend-
ant was in possession pursuant to a contract for purchase and
sale of land under the terms of which defendant was to pay the
total price of $1,200 by September 1, 1861, the contract containing
neither time-of-essence nor forfeiture clauses. The defendant paid
nothing and in November, 1861, sold to one Stout, who went in
to possession. The plaintiff brought an action against the defend-
ant and Stout asking for a judgment for the amount of the pur-
chase price, or in default of payment, that he be decreed to have
a lien, that the premises be sold, and the proceeds applied to the
amount due. The court stated that the relation of the parties was
analogous to that of mortgagor and mortgagee and that the proper
remedy was strict foreclosure.
7
Nevin v. Lulu and White S. M. Co.8 involved a transaction
wherein plaintiff loaned the defendants $12,000, and the defendants
conveyed by warranty deeds some mining property to trustees of
the plaintiff. The defendants stayed in possession. The trustees
and the defendants entered into an agreement whereby the trus-
tees were to notify the defendants within ninety days whether
they wanted to retain a one-half interest in the property, which
they could do on payment of additional money, or whether they
wanted payment of $12,000. Upon the election by the trustees to
take payment and upon failure of defendants to pay the $12,000
within ninety days after notice, defendants were to forfeit all in-
terest in the property, and time was declared to be essential. The
trustees notified defendants that they elected to take payment of
$12,000. The defendants failed to pay on time, and did not pay
anything. The trustees quitclaimed to the plaintiff who brought
action and asked that the deeds be adjudged a mortgage, that there
be a foreclosure and sale, and that plaintiff be given judgment for
01 Colo. 54 (1867).
'WALSH, op. cit., pp. 429-43"1. Strict foreclosure, by which the equitable es-
tate of the purchaser is extinguished by decree unless he completes the purchase
by a date fixed by the court, is allowed in some states where the interest of the
purchaser, as measured by payments of purchase money and for improvements,
is not large. It is clear that where the equity of the purchaser is substantial,
foreclosure by sale should be required in order that the purchaser's interest may
be protected on the sale, just as a mortgagor's equity may be protected in cor-
responding cases of foreclosure of mortgages.
1 10 Colo. 357, 15 P. 611 (1887).
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any deficiency. The lower court decreed strict foreclosure, but on
appeal the court decided that Section 263 of the Code of 1883,
enacted, after the decision in Todd v. Simonton, which provides
that "a mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a convey-
ance whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage
to recover possession of the real property without foreclosure and
sale . . ." applied and that under its terms foreclosure and sale
was the only proper remedy. It is obvious from the facts that the
parties intended only a security transaction. Since defendants had
paid nothing, and since the plaintiff evidently wanted only his
money, there would have been no advantage for counsel to enforce
the forfeiture by bringing a possessory action.
ACTION UNDER. UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE
Ruth v. Smith 9 was the first Colorado case in which counsel
made use of a possessory action against a vendee in possession
pursuant to a contract for purchase and sale of land. The action
was brought under the unlawful detainer statute of 1885,10 which
in its terms was the same as our present forcible entry and de-
tainer statute." In that case the contract contained neither time-
of-essence nor forfeiture clauses. The vendee had paid $41 out
of a total purchase price of $371.20, or about 11 per cent of the
purchase price, and the defendant in that case had been in default
about three months. The defendant did not interpose any equitable
defense or advance the argument that his interest had to be fore-
closed. Instead he elected to stand on his demurrer to the com-
plaint. The case was reversed by the supreme court because the
lower court awarded $86.66 unliquidated damages without hearing
testimony as to the extent of damage, and because the plaintiff
had been awarded greater damages than he had asked for in his
complaint. The court did not object to the possessory action and
did not state that it would be necessary to treat the transaction
as a mortgage. We may infer from this case that, even though
there are no time-of-essence or forfeiture clauses in the contract,
a vendor may recover possession and need not foreclose where the
vendee has paid only 12 per cent of the purchase price and where
he has been in default for three months. It is not clear from the
report or from the record of the case what was to happen to the
$41 paid toward the purchase price by the vendee. It is not clear
whether restitution would be granted if the amount paid by the
vendee exceeded the amount of damages sustained by the vendor.
The next case to be considered is Gordon Tiger Mining and
Reduction Company v. Brown.12 There the contract provided that
the vendee erect a mill on the mining property involved within six
months and operate it continuously; a percentage of the profit
'29 Colo. 154, 68 P. 278 (1901).
10 1 Mills Annotated Statutes, § 1973.
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 70 § 4, Ninth (1935).
56 Colo. 301, 138 P. 51 (1914).
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from the ore mined and milled was to be paid to the vendor until
the vendor had received a total of $200,000, in which was to be
included an amount credited to the vendee because of its payment
of certain liens against the property. There was a clause provid-
ing for forfeiture of payments and of improvements in the event
that the vendee decided that the mines could not be worked profit-
ably. In addition, the parties entered into an escrow agreement
providing that the deeds be deposited with a certain bank to be
delivered to the vendee on production of evidence of payment of
$200,000; on failure of the vendee to fulfill the contract by continu-
ous operation of the mine and mill, the deeds were to be returned to
the vendor. The vendee entered into possession but failed to mine
any ore or erect the mill as agreed, but did make certain improve-
ments. It appears that the vendor intentionally misrepresented the
title as to a one forty-eighth interest, but the vendee did nothing
about it for 16 months after learning of the fraud. When the ven-
dee was in default about 18 months, the vendor brought action for
possession, return of the deeds, and forfeiture of payments and
improvements. The defendant had been credited with payments
consisting of expenses incurred in the payment of liens amounting
to $49,000, and defendant had spent a total of $142,000 for im-
provements. The defendant asked rescission on the ground of fraud
as to the one forty-eighth interest.
FORFEITURE IS UPHELD
The supreme court decided that the defendant had waived its
right of rescission because of its delay but gave the defendant
leave to file an amended answer in the district court. In its
amended answer the defendant asked damages for the fraud and
subrogation to the rights of lien claimants; it alleged it had fraudu-
lently been induced to pay the liens. The plaintiff offered to clear
up the defect in title, and the court then gave the defendant thirty
days in which to decide whether it wished to perform the con-
tract and pay the balance in a reasonable time. The defendant
declined to perform and the district court declared a forfeiture
and rendered a decree quieting title. The Colorado supreme court
on appeal said that in enforcing the forfeiture it was doing noth-
ing more than enforcing the contract and that, although the de-
fendant was entitled to dam4ges, they did not consist of the
amount the defendant would have been entitled to by virtue of a
rescission. In this case, it appears, a forfeiture was enforced
where the contract provided for forfeiture and contained a time-
of-essence clause and the vendee had paid about 25 per cent of
the purchase price, and with improvements had expended a total
equal to approximately 95 per cent of the purchase price; the ven-
dee was 18 months in default. Yet the case is not authority against
the mortgage theory or equitable relief on a similar state of facts
because the district court did offer equitable relief, which offer
was refused. From this case we may infer that, in order to be
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entitled to equitable relief or treatment as a mortgagor, the vendee
must evidence a willingness to perform the contract and must ask
for either or both.
In Roller v. Smith, 3 the next pertinent case in point of time,
we find a contract containing the usual time-of-essence and for-
feiture clauses. The defendant was two months and eight days in
default and had paid about 81/ per cent of the total purchase price
of $4,000. The court paid lip service to forfeitures and said that
the defendant was entitled to no equitable relief because this was
an action to enforce and not to cancel the contract, thereby imply-
ing that the court would deny equitable relief in all such actions
no matter what the interest of the vendee. The court held for the
defendant because notice of forfeiture to the vendee was not ac-
cording to the terms of the contract. The court's statements re-
garding denial of equitable relief are therefore dicta. But it may
be asked whether payments by the vendee of only 81/,2 per cent con-
stitute a sufficient interest to warrant protection by a court of
equity. The court in its opinion states that the defendant asked
equitable relief, although a search of the record in the supreme
court does not reveal that the defendant had advanced any such
claim or request. The case also illustrates the fact that forfeitures
are viewed with disfavor in both law and equity, and a court will
usually demand strict compliance with the terms of a forfeiture
provision. In this case the court found that notice from the as-
signee of the vendor was not sufficient under the terms of the
contract.
No EQUITABLE RELIEF WHERE SMALL PERCENTAGE IS PAID
Schiffner v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.14 is a clear case where
the Colorado court enforced a forfeiture. In that case counsel for
the vendee insisted that the defendant had an interest in the land
and that the relationship of the parties was like that of mortgagor
and mortgagee. The court in its opinion said that there can be
no mortgage unless the mortgagor has real estate to pledge, and
in that case the defendant had none. The contract had the usual
provisions, forfeiture and time-of-essence clauses, although that
fact was not stressed by counsel for the vendor, nor was it men-
tioned by the court in its opinion. The case might be considered
by some as authority for enforcing a forfeiture clause under all
circumstances, but an examination of the facts shows its limita-
tions. The action was brought under the unlawful detainer statute
and involved two tracts of land; the vendee had made no payments
on installments at all; as to one tract, only about 7 per cent of
the purchase price had been paid, and as to the other only 13 per
cent had been paid. The vendee was in default for a period of five
years and four months, and the vendee made no effort or statement
that he was willing to tender any of the amount due. The defend-
ant did, however, show that as to one tract of land he had expended
"76 Colo. 371, 231 P. 656 (1924).
"79 Colo. 249, 244 P. 1012 (1926).
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considerable sums for improvements, in addition to the payment
of 7 per cent of the purchase price. All the case decides, therefore,
is that where the vendee has paid only 7 per cent to 13 per cent of
the purchase price, has been guilty of long delay, and has made
no offer to tender the amount due, he will not be entitled to treat-
ment as a mortgagor or to relief in equity. The amount spent for
improvements can be of little importance unless such amount is
spent in pursuance of the contract, for it cannot be said that the
vendor wants the improvements even though they do pass to him
in the event of a forfeiture.
VENDOR BRINGS ACTION TO QUIET TITLE
Phares v. Don Carlos,15 Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land
Co.,16 Pope v. Parker,17 American Mortgage Co. v. Logan,"8 and
Lowe v. Sory 11 are all cases in which the vendor brought action to
quiet title. In the Phares case the vendee was not in possession.
The vendee had defaulted on certain indebtedness due the plain-
tiff, and the property securing the debt had been sold pursuant to
a trust deed. The parties entered into a new agreement whereby
the defendant had the option to redeem provided payment was made
before a certain date. The defendant failed to make payment on
time, and time was extended twenty days on the defendant's pay-
ment of 25 per cent of the purchase price and agreement to pay
a $100 bonus. On failure of the defendant to make further pay-
ment on time, the plaintiff brought action to quiet title. The lower
court held for the plaintiff and denied the defendant any relief.
The Colorado supreme court refused to enforce a forfeiture be-
cause the contract contained no forfeiture clause. Apparently on
the theory that time was essential, it denied that the defendant
had any interest in the land, granted the defendant restitution
and quieted title. The case does not contradict the thesis of this
paper (supra, end of second paragraph). As has been noted the
vendee was not in possession, and it does not appear that the ven-
dee offered to tender the balance due.
In the Harkness Heights Land Co. case, again the vendee was
not in possession. 20 There the appealing defendant claimed under
one Addis who had an unrecorded contract of purchase from the
plaintiff company which held record title. Addis had paid about
26 per cent of the purchase price and was four months in default.
The contract provided that time was essential and for forfeiture.
The defendant relied solely on the theory of estoppel, in that the
1871 Colo. 508, 208 P. 458 (1922).
"76 Colo. 597, 233 P. 831 (1925).
"84 Colo. 535, 271 P. 1118 (1928).
1890 Colo. 157, 7 P. 2d 953 (1932).
"101 Colo. 341, 111 P. 2d 1054 (1941).
-" WALSH, OP. cit., p. 376. It seems clear that the notion that possession gives
the purchaser an equitable interest which he would not have otherwise is not
based on any valid reason . . . Possession, particularly when the purchaser has
changed his position by making improvements will make his equitable claim to




plaintiff had held Addis out as owner and was now estopped from
denying title in Addis. The court found that the evidence showed
that the defendant's agent who conducted the transaction for the
defendant had notice of the plaintiff's title and that Addis held
by contract. The court quieted the plaintiff's title. The defendant
did not ask for restitution and it is an interesting question whether
restitution to the defendant as assignee of Addis' interest would
have been granted. In view of the Phares case, it is believed that
restitution would have been granted had it been sought. It is diffi-
cult to see why the addition of a forfeiture clause in the Harkness
Heights Land Co. case should make any difference if it were found
that the amount retained was not liquidated damages but was a
penalty. Since the total amount paid, although amounting to
about 26 per cent of the purchase price, was only $140, it may be
that the court would have considered it as liquidated damages had
a claim for restitution been advanced.
A POSSIBLE RULE
Pope v. Parker 21 is a case which further helps us in trying
to develop a workable rule. The assignee of the vendee was in
possession pursuant to contract, and the assignor defaulted. There
was a new agreement, and the assignor again defaulted. The as-
signor then gave the plaintiff vendor a quitclaim deed, and the
plaintiff brought action. Thirty-one per cent of the purchase price
had been paid, and the time in default under the second contract
was about three months. The first contract had neither time-of-
essence nor forfeiture clauses, but the second contract did pro-
vide that time was essential. The court said that both contracts
were mortgages which secured to the plaintiff the performance
of the vendee's obligation, and that the fact that the plaintiff re-
tained title to the property as security had the same effect as if
the defendant's assignor had conveyed it to him, thereby deciding,
by implication, that it made no difference in the court's decision
whether the contract declared time to be essential or not. The
court held that under Section 281 of the Code (1921), since the
contract was in effect a mortgage, the only proper remedy was
foreclosure.
Why must the contract in this case be treated as a mortgage
while those in Roller v. Smith and in Schiffner v. Chicago Title
and Trust Co., supra, were not so treated? These cases were de-
cided within four years. In the Pope case the vendee's payments
were in a greater amount. In the Smith case only 81/ per cent of
the purchase price had been paid, and in the Schiffner case, from
7 per cent to 13 per cent had been paid as compared with about
30 per cent here. Further, in the Schiffner case the vendee had
been in default-over five years and made no attempt to tender the
amount due.
. In the American Mortgage Co. v. Logan case, 22 the vendor
brought action to quiet title; the contract had time-of-essence and
21 Supra, note 17.
2 Supra, note 18.
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forfeiture clauses. The court held that the contract was not a
mortgage and that the defendant was entitled to no relief against
a forfeiture. But there the vendee was not in possession. There
were two extensions of time by subsequent agreements, and al-
though the defendant was credited with payment of $8,000, or 30
per cent of the purchase price, that payment had been made in
stock of the vendee company which was largely worthless. 23
In Lowe v. Sory'2 4 the vendor brought action to quiet title.
The total purchase price was $30,000, and in addition the defend-
ant agreed to pay the sums of $4,544.17 and $1,650 to other persons
interested in the property. The defendants pleaded that the plain-
tiff had wrongfully obtained possession of the property, and de-
fendants asked that they be given possession, that they be decreed
to have equitable title and be given damages. Plaintiff's general
demurrer was sustained and defendants refused to amend. The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling quieting title in the
vendor. Defendants had paid $13,500 out of the total purchase of
$30,000 or about 45 per cent. The defendants' interest in this case
was greater than that in Pope v. Parker where the court had refused
to enforce a forfeiture. However, here the defendant was not in pos-
session, and made no attempt to offer to pay the amount due. The
court said that the possession of the plaintiff was lawful "consider-
ing that the defendants were in default, not attempted to be gain-
said, and that as the result thereof plaintiff enjoyed contractual right
to 're-enter upon the premises and take possession.'" The court
noted that the defendant had not alleged that they came within
the rule cited in the American Mortgage Co.. case 25 and that de-
fendants did not allege their inability to perform, or that plaintiff
caused defendants' default or contributed thereto. The court said
that defendants' attitude toward their obligation to pay, by their
pleading, seemed to be that they did not intend or even wish to
pay. Thus in addition to the fact that the defendants had been
given extensions, it appears that they were not in possession and
made no attempt or offer to tender the amount due.
RELIEF WHERE LARGE PERCENTAGE OF PRICE IS PAID
The case of Fairview Corp. v. American Mines and Smelting
Co.26 involved a lease and option to purchase some mining property.
The price was to be paid in yearly installments, and certain royal-
ties from the working of the mine were to be applied to the pur-
chase price. The defendant defaulted in payment of the install-
ments, and there were several new agreements whereby time was
extended. On the day of the last installment the vendor sent notice
21 Frazer Arnold, The Mortgage in Essence: A Stride Forward in Equity, 19
Rocky Mt. L. R. 123 (1947).
1 Supra, note 19.
'The general rule is that a vendee is not entitled to relief against a for-
feiture where he makes no attempt to fulfill his part of the contract, and where
his default was not caused by fraud, ignorance not wilful, surprise, accident,
or mistake.
2686 Colo. 77, 278 P. 800 (1926).
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of a forfeiture. The vendee had paid about 57 per cent of the pur-
chase price and was less that one month in default after his fail-
ure to pay during the period provided for in the contract for pay-
ment after notice. There were neither time-of-essence nor for-
feiture clauses in the contract. The court said that the lease and
option agreement merged into a contract of purchase and sale by
the extension agreements and stressed that a large part of the
purchase price had been paid. It pointed to the absence in the
contract of forfeiture and time-of-essence clauses.27 The court held
that the relationship of the parties was similar to that of mort-
gagor and mortgagee, saying that the plaintiff kept title for secur-
ity only and that his proper action was in foreclosure.
FORFEITURE CLAUSE NOT CONTROLLING
On the basis of cases thus far considered it might be said that
the provision in the contract for a forfeiture is of importance be-
cause in the cases of Pope v. Parker and Fairview Mining Corp. v.
American Mines and Smelting Co., both supra, there were no pro-
visions for forfeiture. But the more recent cases now to be con-
sidered reject any such thesis. In Rocky Mountain Gold Mines,
Inc. v. Gold, Silver, and Tungsten, Inc.,2s there was a lease which
provided for fulfillment of various conditions as to the working
of the mine, including getting a certain mill in working condition
by a certain date. On failure to do so the lessor was to pay lessee
a certain sum each 30 days thereafter until the mill was in the
stipulated condition. The lessor was to receive certain royalties
from the mining operation, and if the royalties did not equal cer-
tain fixed sums at certain stated dates the lessee was to make up
the difference. Time was declared essential, and on failure of the
lessee to perform any covenant, the lessor might terminate the
lease. The lessee agreed to surrender the property on expiration
or termination of the lease. There was also an option to purchase,
after full payment. Performance of the lease terms was essential
to the right to exercise the option. The total purchase price was
$85,000. The lessee had paid $53,148.62 or about 62 per cent of
the purchase price, and had made improvements and spent money
getting operations started in an amount which far exceeded the
purchase price. The defendant failed to pay one-half of a monthly
payment and plaintiff sent notice of termination and brought ac-
tion of ejectment. The defendant asked relief in equity. The
supreme court said that it appeared that the main purpose of the
lease and option agreement was the sale of the property and pay-
ment of the purchase price and that when the vendee has substan-
tially performed, the contract operates as security as to the bal-
ance to be paid, and equitable relief is available. The court noted
that there was no long delay, that the time-of-essence clause was
not controlling, and that there was no need for the defendant to
tender the amount due because that rule does not apply in an
21 Time is always of the essence in an option agreement, but as has been
stated the original agreement had merged into one of purchase and sale.
28104 Colo. 478, 93 P. 2d 973 (1939).
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action which has as its object only the construction of a contract and
relation of the parties.
29
In Cavos v. Geihsler 30 the court again recognized that there
was a point at which the vendee by his payments would obtain a
sufficient interest in the property to be protected as a mortgagor
or by relief in equity. The vendees had agreed to assume an exist-
ing encumbrance on the property and taxes, and in addition, to
make monthly payments with interest. The defendants had re-
duced the encumbrance, but according to the findings of fact of
the lower court they still owed slightly more than the original
amount of the amount payable in monthly installments. The con-
tract provided that time was of the essence, and for forfeiture.
In all, the defendants paid close to 18 per cent of the total pur-
chase price and were in default 31 days on a new contract exe-
cuted by the parties. The supreme court ordered the trial court
to enter a decree of strict foreclosure, granting defendants six
months to pay the amount due.
CASE IS OF LIMITED APPLICATION
It does not seem that the case determines the lowest level at
which a vendee has by payment obtained a sufficient interest in
the property to warrant protection by equity. The finding of fact
was that the defendants still owed over $1,500 in installments and
$2,200 on the encumbrance out of a total purchase price of $4,500,
and the Supreme Court of Colorado recited the finding of facts of
the lower court. But the supreme court had written an opinion
declaring a forfeiture, reversing a decree of foreclosure in the
lower court. On rehearing, an amicus curiae brief was filed which
pointed to the fact that the plaintiff, although frequently requested
to do so, could not show how much had been paid by the defend-
ants. The brief further pointed to convincing evidence in the
record that the defendants had made payments on an average of
$45 per month during the total time in occupancy, for about five
years. From the evidence in the record it is hard to see how the
lower court reached its conclusion that the defendant still owed
more than the original total amount to be paid in installments. It
is possible that the court reversed itself because it believed that
the defendants had paid more than 18 per cent of the purchase
price.
Wiley v. Lininger 31 was a case where the contract had no time-
of-essence nor forfeiture clauses. Counsel brought action asking
foreclosure. The lower court gave the plaintiff judgment for the
back installment and interest and gave the defendant six months
to pay the amount due into the registry of the court; if the defend-
ant failed to do so, the plaintiff was to be at liberty to petition
the court for such further order as might be proper. The Supreme
Court of Colorado found that the contention of the defendant that
It is not apparent how an action in ejectment can be termed one for a
declaratory judgment.
so 109 Colo. 163, 123 P. 2d 822 (1942).
119 Colo. 497, 204 P. 2d 1083 (1949)
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the decree of the lower court worked a forfeiture was untenable,
and that the lower court was in error in entering judgment for
the amount due, since the plaintiff had requested foreclosure. The
court did not direct the trial court what decree to enter, but stated
that the lower court should take into consideration the fact that
the defendant had made substantial payments and that the con-
tract did not provide for a forfeiture.
COURT AGAIN DENIES MORTGAGE THEORY
In the last case to be considered, Miller v. Temple,3 2 we again
find the court denying that the typical contract for purchase and
sale of land could be a mortgage. The contract provided that time
was of the essence and for forfeiture, and the vendee was to be
guilty of unlawful detainer if he held possession after notice of
forfeiture. The court said that it would defeat the clear provision
in the contract for action in unlawful detainer if the contract be
held a mortgage, but such statement was made because of the un-
usual facts in the case. The assignee of the vendee had sold to
the plaintiff when the last payment under the contract was four
days overdue and promised conveyance of title upon payment of
the balance of $2,500 in two years, which was the amount owed
to the vendor. The vendor went to see the plaintiff who had gone
into possession and told him that $2,500 was still due on the con-
tract, but no definite arrangements were made between the plain-
tiff and vendor about payment. About five months later the vendor
served notice of forfeiture, whereupon the plaintiff brought action
for specific performance alleging an oral agreement on the part
of the vendor to accept plaintiff's promissory note for the balance
due. The defendant filed a cross-complaint in unlawful detainer.
The finding of fact was against the plaintiff regarding the oral
agreement alleged. We find that in this case the vendor had re-
ceived payments amounting to about 30 per cent of the purchase
price and that the default had existed for a year and eight months.
The plaintiff, vendee, claimed at the trial that he did not know
whom to pay and that he was willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price. The vendor stated on cross-examination that he
was willing to accept payment of the balance of the purchase price.
The court granted the vendee thirty days to pay the balance due
and cited the rule of the American Mortgage Co. case. 33 While the
rule seems to fit the facts of this case, it does not fit the facts of
any of the other cases in which the court has refused to enforce a
forfeiture. Why then, if this is the true rule, has not a forfeiture
been enforced in those cases? It may be that the court was willing
to allow the buyer in the Miller case equitable relief even after he
had been in default for a longer period of time than is usual in
the cases, because of his ignorance; or it may be that the case
limits the time in default which will be allowed to one year and
eight months; default in the other cases where the court refused
120 Colo. 546, 211 P. 2d 989 (1949).
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to enforce a forfeiture did not exceed six weeks, e.g., Rocky Moun-
tain Gold Mines case ;34 default in the Cavos case 35 was only 31
days, but there had ben several new agreements extending time.
More important, probably, is that the buyer was in possession,
that about 30 per cent of the purchase price had been paid, that
the vendee claimed that he was entitled to treatment as mortgagor,
and that the vendee was ready and willing to tender the balance due.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the cases has shown that the court has
stated different rules in its decisions. But the cases can perhaps
be distinguished and thus reconciled. The elements of reconcilia-
tion and distinction are: payment of a substantial part of the
purchase price, possession by the vendee, length of time in default,
and whether the vendee is willing to pay the amount due. If the
cases are examined under this viewpoint, as has been done,
it will be seen that when all elements have been present the buyer
has been treated as mortgagor or granted equitable relief.
In the cases of Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land Co.; Phares
v. Don Carlos; American Mortgage Co. v. Logan; and Lowe v. Sory
the vendee was not in possession. Foreclosure and sale or strict
foreclosure were not deemed proper, and a forfeiture was enforced
in all those cases except that of Phares v. Don Carlos where resti-
tution was granted the vendee. In the Lowe case the vendee had
made payments amounting to about 45 per cent of the purchase
price, a greater amount than in other cases where the court re-
fused to enforce a forfeiture, but in addition to not being in pos-
session, the vendee did not attempt to pay the balance due.
In the cases of Fairview Mining Corp. v. American Mines and
Smelting Co.; Pope v. Parker; Rocky Mountain Gold Mines v. Gold,
Silver, and Tungsten; Cavos v. Geihsler; and Miller v. Temple the
vendee was treated as mortgagor or given a chance to redeem
within a time set by the court. In the Cavos case only about 18 per
cent of the purchase price had been paid, but for reasons stated
it is not believed that the Cavos case can be considered representa-
tive as to the percentage of the purchase price which will consti-
tute a sufficient payment by the vendee. About 30 per cent of the
purchase price had been paid in Pope v. Parker and Miller v. Tem-
ple and over one-half in the Fairview and Rocky Mountain cases.
Thus it may be inferred that payment of about 30 per cent of the
purchase price by the vendee may constitute a sufficient interest
if the other elements are present.
A willingness to pay the amount due and the length of time
in default have only been mentioned by the court in cases where
the payments by the vendee have been small, or when he was not
in possession. Therefore, it is not known whether either factor
would be of controlling importance in the event that the vendee
had made substantial payments and was in possession.
Supra, note 28.
Supra, note 30.
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